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THEORETICAL ARTICLE Open Access
Developing an alternative formulation of SCP
principles – the Ds (11 and counting)
Paul Ekblom1* and Alexander Hirschfield2
Abstract
Background: The 25 Techniques of Situational Crime Prevention remain one of the bedrocks of research in Crime
Science and play a key role in managing knowledge of research and practice. But they are not the only way of
organising, transferring and applying this knowledge.
Discussion: Taking the 25 Techniques and their theoretical underpinnings as our starting point, this paper presents
the (currently) 11 Ds, a set of intervention principles which focus specifically on how the interventions are intended
to influence the offender in the proximal crime situation. The context of this work was a project to help security
managers detect and control attempts to undertake 'hostile reconnaissance' of public places by those planning to
commit crimes or acts of terrorism. We discuss why we judged 25 Techniques as a model for emulation in general
terms but unsuitable in detail for the present purpose. We also describe the process of developing the principles,
which involved both reflection, and capture of new knowledge from theory and practice, including the security
domain. The distinctive contribution of professional design to this process is noted. We then present the Ds
themselves and show how, as generic principles, they relate to practical methods of prevention; how they can be
further organised to aid their learning and their use; how they relate to other formulations such as the Conjunction
of Criminal Opportunity; and how they might apply, with expansion perhaps, to the wider field of SCP.
Summary: We discuss the process and the wider benefits of developing alternative – but rigorously linked –
perspectives on the same theories and phenomena both for transferring existing research knowledge to practice
and for sparking leading-edge theory and research.
Keywords: Situational crime prevention; Problem-oriented policing; 25 Techniques; Design; Crime science;
Knowledge management; Practice; Crime scripts; Deterrence
Background
Situational Crime Prevention (SCP, see Clarke 2008) and
Problem-Oriented Policing (Scott et al. 2008) are major
defining domains within Crime Science (e.g. Laycock
2005). Overall, Crime Science aims to constitute the hub
of rigorous research and theory applied to the practice of
reducing the risk of criminal events. Risk in turn covers
the possibility of undesired criminal (and related) events
happening at all, the probability of their occurrence and
the harmful consequences that may follow (e.g. Ekblom
2012a).
Over the last three decades a large body of research and
theory-based practice knowledge has accumulated, mostly
accessible via the website of the Center for Problem-
Oriented Policing. There are various core organising ele-
ments of this knowledge:
 An ‘action-research’ model of the preventive
process, SARA (Scanning, Analysis, Response,
Assessment);
 A basic model of the proximal causation of criminal
events, and guide to the mechanisms or principles of
preventive interventions, the Problem Analysis
Triangle (PAT, formerly Crime Triangle);
 A structured and cumulative catalogue of practical
preventive methods, the 25 Techniques of SCP
(25 T);
 Various crime-type specific empirical assemblages of
risk and protective factors, more associated with the
offence than the offender, characterising particular
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crime targets e.g. the CRAVED properties of ‘hot
products’ (Concealable, Removable, Available,
Valuable, Enjoyable, Disposable) (Clarke 1999) and
terrorism-related target selection factors (EVIL
DONE: Clarke and Newman 2006);
 A process language, crime scripts (Cornish 1994) for
describing the sequential aspects of criminal events
and related behaviour.
These frameworks, thoroughly described in Clarke and
Eck (2003) and Wortley and Mazerrolle (2008), relate to
underlying theories/perspectives. For example PAT, cen-
tring on Offender, Target/Victim and Place, is close to the
Routine Activities triad of Offender, Target and Guardian
(Cohen and Felson 1979) especially when the triangle is
embellished with its outer ‘crime preventer’ roles of guard-
ians, managers and handlers). The 25 T were originally
organised exclusively in terms of the offender’s Rational
Choice ‘opportunity’ agenda (Cornish and Clarke 1986) of
risk, effort and reward. Later were added two ad hoc prin-
ciples of removing excuses and controlling provocations,
the latter reflecting ‘crime precipitation’ theory (Wortley
2008). This describes a two-stage process of causation of
criminal events, with situational determination of op-
portunity preceded by situational arousing or releasing
of motivation (permissions, prompts, provocations and
pressures).
Partial competitors exist to SARA (e.g. 5Is, a more de-
tailed equivalent with major task streams of Intelligence,
Intervention, Implementation, Involvement and Impact:
see Ekblom 2011) and PAT (e.g. Conjunction of Criminal
Opportunity, with causation of criminal events differenti-
ated into 11 elements, and counterpart intervention prin-
ciples: see Ekblom 2010, 2011). These evolved from a
critique of limitations of the familiar frameworks, address-
ing knowledge management concerns over consistency,
integration and the ability to organise complex and de-
tailed knowledge of practice. Whatever the ultimate reso-
lution of such competition, the theme pursued in this
paper is that the traditional frameworks are not the only
ways of organising Crime Science knowledge for practice,
research and theory. There are cases where it is both
desirable and appropriate to manipulate, reconfigure and
add to existing theoretical frameworks to generate princi-
ples and methods that can be applied to different and
evolving crime and security threats.
In some ways we can consider our knowledge like a
rough diamond: to get it to radiate, scintillate and stimu-
late in a multitude of ways, we occasionally need to cut
and polish new facets into it, to afford us different views
into the rich interior. One such facet is the Ds frame-
work, for organising our knowledge and thinking about
how preventive interventions work by influencing the
offender.
Genesis of the Ds
The origins of the Ds framework were in contract work
for the UK’s Centre for Protection of National Infrastruc-
ture (CPNI). The project concerned the development of
an interactive computer-based toolkit to help security
managers of large, crowded or critical infrastructure sites
to control hostile reconnaissance by perpetrators. This is
the process whereby those with malintent strategically se-
lect sites that are desirable and feasible to attack, and sim-
ultaneously acquire tactical information. Underlying the
toolkit was the rationale that if you control reconnais-
sance, you reduce the risk of main attack, whether by
terrorists, armed robbers, industrial spies or protesters.
The initial requirement was to incorporate ideas and ap-
proaches from SCP and POP, to widen the scope of the
‘what works’ knowledge drawn on, and to enrich the
thinking of ‘mainstream’ security practitioners. This led
ultimately to the toolkit, now under final user test on a
secure website. A presentation (Willcocks et al. 2012) is
available from the authors.
The paper proceeds as follows. We first describe the
process of capturing client/user requirements for the
hostile reconnaissance toolkit as a whole, and then cover
what content-knowledge was gleaned from the security
domain and from Crime Science. We next focus on the
particular contribution from 25 T, and identify limita-
tions for present purposes which led us to develop an al-
ternative formulation centring on a greater number of
principles and a lesser number of methods of control,
and focusing more single-mindedly on influencing the
offender. We set out these principles and methods and
briefly relate user reactions. In the summary we report
on the process of developing the framework – know-how
that can be applied in evolving other facets for our
knowledge as and when needed. We review the benefits
to practitioners of using the method/principle distinction
and the Ds in particular, and cover counterpart benefits
to Crime Science. Finally we look ahead to further devel-
opments and consider some wider implications for
Crime Science.
Discussion
The development of the toolkit involved a mixed team of
crime scientists and designers, with close involvement of
clients (CPNI and their colleagues) and end-users (secur-
ity managers). Capturing client and user requirements was
undertaken in step with reviewing literature from both the
security world and that of SCP/POP to seek and then
combine principles and practices which would, suitably
organised and formulated, meet those requirements.
Capturing client/user requirements
Requirements capture supported considerations of both
toolkit content and toolkit design. For the designers it
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was important to determine what format(s) the toolkit
should take; how it could fit best and prove most useful
within users’ existing patterns of work and routines on
site; as well as informing what level and kinds of content
should be presented, in order to produce a genuinely ac-
cessible, usable and valuable toolkit for these groups.
The interview consultations and feedback were fed dir-
ectly into multiple stages of the design process from the
respective rounds of interview iterations. This, in turn,
helped shape the definition and development of the tool-
kit concept designs, which were then shown and trialled
for further feedback during consecutive stages.
Requirements capture involved a) initially five site visits
to diverse venues including major rail stations, shopping
malls and football stadium; and b) hour-long semi-
structured interviews with 20 stakeholders comprising in
roughly equal proportion government and police security
advisers, and additional site security managers. People and
sites were identified through a combination of recommen-
dations by CPNI (who also vouched for our good intent)
and prior local research contacts.
The site types and instances were chosen because they
covered a diverse range of the kind of venues where
action was required and where security managers, of suf-
ficient experience and organisational authority/resour-
cing, were present and empowered to take that action.
These sites were later supplemented by visits to indus-
trial plants as the scope of the study was extended. Each
visit comprised a tour of the site followed by mainly
group interviews with relevant security personnel.
These interviews and the additional stakeholder inter-
views each ran for approximately one hour, and were
conducted using a semi-structured questionnaire. The
primary aim of the interviews with security managers
was to gain an understanding of what the job involved,
particularly in conducting surveillance at different types
of site, to explore how far they worked in partnership
with other agencies, their degree of autonomy in making
decisions about security measures and to identify their
awareness, knowledge and experience in recognising and
responding to hostile reconnaissance. Of particular im-
portance here, was how far they felt they had sufficient
information to alert them to a possible attack, who to
share this information with and what action to take
under such circumstances. Questions probed their views
on the need for appropriate guidance in such situations
and the content, nature and format of any future guid-
ance, particularly, the development of a web-based tool-
kit. Different toolkit design options were presented to
the respondents towards the end of the interview. Inter-
views with official security advisers covered many of the
same issues but also sought to better understand the ad-
visory role, particularly the way in which advisors inter-
acted and communicated with security managers, their
views on how far hostile reconnaissance was a priority
for security managers and the extent to which the latter
complied with their advice.
We found that sites were highly varied (in terms of size,
functions and layout), often individually complex (e.g.
changes in usage and customer base by time of day) and
with varied ownership and control over land. Employment
practices on site, including the hiring and vetting of staff,
were also subject to variation when site employees worked
for different companies.
Security issues changed strongly over daily, weekly and
monthly cycles depending on activities and closures. Se-
curity managers had extremely variable levels of know-
ledge and available time (some were general managers
or engineers with add-on security responsibilities, others
were specialists with a police/military background); and
the kind of high-impact/low probability events in ques-
tion were challenging to plan and to budget for.
The toolkit had to handle all these issues, bringing se-
curity, SCP and POP together in a way that was inclusive
of ability levels, and generic across the diversity of venues.
It had to focus on perpetrator actions and goals because
security managers can never be quite sure of the specific
nature of the criminal acts to be expected, hence are in no
position to focus on a narrow set of threatsa. It also
needed to be generative, i.e. capable of producing a wide
range of suggestions for action that were plausible in
both scientific and practical terms; that offered versatil-
ity and ‘design freedom’ (Ekblom 2012a, b) for managers
of all levels of sophistication working in diverse sites;
and that gave them a mental schema to adjust know-
ledge of what works at theoretical/practical levels to
their own working context. This last, respecting the
strong context-dependence of what works, is considered
central to effective crime prevention (Pawson and Tilley
1997; Ekblom 2011).
Learning from security
Rapid familiarisation with the conventional security litera-
ture yielded rather thin pickings. Terminologically, the in-
terventions came under two generic headings – deter and
detect and that was largely it. For a discipline purporting
to influence a wide range of human misbehaviour, this
was disappointingly limited, although we concede a more
thorough investigation might have yielded more. More in-
teresting was an encounter with Effects-Based Operations
e.g. Batschelet (2002): this is a process, military in origin,
of careful identification of one’s adversary’s strategic and
tactical goals, followed by assembling a combination of
highly-focused efforts to try to block them.
What did Crime Science offer?
Traditional Crime Science frameworks similarly revealed
limitations in what they could offer. PAT in fact took us
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little further than existing security knowledge, although
the latter’s language was rather different, less consistent
and less analytic. Risk-factor approaches such as EVIL
DONE (for identifying targets at risk of terrorist attack –
Clarke and Newman 2006) were useful elsewhere in the
toolkit (under ‘think opportunity’). SARA, having evolved
as a process for identifying and responding to empirical
risk patterns in what are often open-ended collections of
sites, was not particularly adapted to assessing risks of a
known category of malicious behaviour in a known site.
Although the toolkit itself did require a process model to
take the user through the action steps, we drew on a wider
range of sources than SARA, including 5Is; but this is not
the focus of the present article (Willcocks and Ekblom
2012 give some impression).
We reached the working position that the only common
organising factors behind helping security managers under-
stand and control hostile reconnaissance in diverse sites,
and diverse situations within these, were what the perpet-
rator is trying to do and how. So we decided to centre our
ideas for the toolkit initially on what the perpetrator is try-
ing to achieve (effects), how (scripts), and then flip to how
the security team might anticipate, recognise and control
this (interventions). (The full sequence in the toolkit can
be described as ‘think perpetrator’, ‘think opportunity’,
‘think intervention’, think designer’ and ‘think manager’).
For this purpose 25 T looked a more promising start.
The 25 techniques
We looked at the 25 T at various levels (readers are rec-
ommended to consult the diagram at the Center for
Problem-Oriented Policing website www.popcenter.org/
25techniques/): what we termed principles (the five col-
umns of increase the effort of offending, increase risks,
reduce rewards, reduce provocations and remove ex-
cuses); the method category level (the 25 cells, e.g. ‘re-
move targets’); and the method exemplar level (i.e. the
specific instances of action listed under each category,
e.g. ‘removable car radio’, ‘women’s refuges’).
We did try to populate a 25 T table with hostile-
reconnaissance-relevant exemplars of our own invention,
but the results did not take us very far. Considering our-
selves in effect as stand-ins for users, the experience in-
dicated that a more radical approach was needed to
stimulate the envisaging of a wide range of context- and
problem-appropriate solutions. Our next move was thus
to attempt to identify how far the 25Ts were helpful for
our present purposes:
 Not all principles – e.g. provocation – appeared
immediately suitable for addressing hostile
reconnaissance (our immediate project goal, though
beyond this, provocation makes a comeback as will
be seen).
 The principles were rather too broad in their
connection with underlying causal mechanisms –
too few to handle the variety of intervention
mechanisms we judged to be important.
 There is a concern (e.g. Ekblom and Sidebottom
2008) that the ‘risk, effort and reward’ principles are
‘interchangeable currency’ in that increasing the
effort, say, may cause the perpetrator to tolerate
greater risk if the reward is large enough, implying
that the intervention principle intended may not be
the one that is ultimately delivered or that adaptive
and motivated perpetrators may adjust to it; also
that risk, effort and reward cannot be seen as factors
in isolation to be considered one at a time but part
of a holistic decision agenda.
 The method category content within each of the
principle columns comprise rather ad hoc
assemblages of techniques, adequate for a very
general-purpose knowledge bank but perhaps not
for a highly-focused project as at present.
 Many method categories were already known to
security: e.g. Control Access. Not all categories
seemed suitable for highly motivated perpetrators:
e.g. making compliance easier.
 Few existing exemplars leapt out at us as relevant,
novel to security and transferrable.
If not 25 T for this project, then where next?
Beyond the 25 techniques
Moving on from the 25 T involved a fairly explicit exer-
cise in design. We wanted to:
 Retain the principles/method-categories/method-
exemplars structure of the 25 T (and incidentally
also of 5Is) as we considered this fundamentally a
good way of organising practice knowledge (we set
out the benefits of principles below);
 Therefore ensure that principles and methods were
distinct, offering perspectives that were alternative,
not superior/inferior;
 Link principles more clearly to causal mechanisms,
which are at the heart of the Scientific Realist
approach to evaluation and transfer of its results to
practice (Tilley 1993a, b; Pawson and Tilley 1997;
Ekblom 2002, 2011; Wikström 2007);
 Tie the principles to the ‘think perpetrator’
approach, and focus consistently on the final
common causal pathway of the offender (unlike
25 T which ranged between situation and
offender);
 Link method categories more firmly to method
exemplars in the form of ‘practical actions that the
security manager users could take’;
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 Wherever possible, maintain continuity of terms/
concepts with 25 T.
We also wanted to produce material both applicable
to our diverse scenarios and versatile, with an eye to
utility beyond this project.
The result was a wider range of control principles than
in 25 T and a narrower range of generic control method
categories; this allowed for a fully open-ended set of spe-
cific practical actions rather than a limited set of method
exemplars. (We also shifted terminology from ‘preven-
tion’ to ‘control’ on the grounds that not all the actions
against reconnaissance would be preventive in the sense
of preceding the criminal event. Another terminological
move was to substitute ‘perpetrator’ for ‘offender’ to fit
better with security/counter-terrorist literature and the
inability to find a more specific term: ‘hostile reconnais-
seur’ was contemplated, but not for long).
The principles and methods finally adopted were the out-
come of intensive reflection and debate among the research
team, with the clients and with users in the many iterations
of designing and improving the content, language and
structure of the toolkit over the course of several months.
This process involved group feedback sessions with the cli-
ent’s staff and other security experts, in which extensive
notes were taken and systematically incorporated in the
next iteration; single user workshop trials (where each
practitioner was first observed working through the toolkit
with no additional prompts or designer-initiated questions,
and then taken through again with active prompts and
queries about content, navigation etc.); and four brief field
trials which involved visiting individual security managers,
and taking them through the toolkit applied to a real-life
zone within their own site. The sites included a major City
of London office block, a large Yorkshire railway station
and a chemical plant in Greater Manchester.
Control methods
The control methods we defined, being tangible and
practical, were fairly straightforward to determine. They
derived variously from category headings and exemplars
of 25 T; from numerous security practice guides; and
from picking the brains of the security advisers and end-
users involved in the requirements capture and trial iter-
ation stages. We were careful, too, to focus users at this
point on methods of intervention (i.e. those that inter-
vened in the causes of the criminal or terrorist events)
rather than methods of implementation or of involve-
ment, a distinction introduced in the 5Is framework,
differentiating the ‘Response’ stage of SARA.
The list of basic control methods that emerged was
surprisingly brief:
 Access control;
 Exit control;
 Constraining specific movement and behaviour (of
perpetrator and other users, for example forbidding
photography);
 Surveillance (and consequent action e.g. targeted
challenge);
 Security escort (close accompaniment of visitors
around the site);
 Random confrontations/challenges;
 Information/misinformation (for example
highlighting/exaggerating ‘new security measures’ of
unknown type on the venue’s website, and removing
views helpful for reconnaissance; or ‘decoy’
techniques to differentially attract perpetrators to
particular locations such as spuriously labelled
‘secure areas’, thereby making them self-reveal their
intentions when they loiter there).
Control principles
Pinning down what we meant by the ‘principles’ was
somewhat harder. Only after persistent contemplation
did their nature become explicit. Here we should note
the contribution of the information/communications de-
signers in the team, whose graphic reflections of what
we were fumbling towards greatly aided the articulation
process.
The defining nature of the principles that emerged
was how the interventions are intended to influence the
offender in the proximal crime situation.
This enabled us, say, to distinguish between ‘supply in-
formation/misinformation’ as a method, and ‘deceive per-
petrators’ as a principle. Generally principle and method
were linked through a ‘by’ sentence: ‘Deceive perpetrators
by misinformation’… ‘Defeat perpetrators by controlling
movement and behaviour’.
The principles that resulted came from diverse sources
including principles, categories and exemplars of 25 T,
security practice and the Conjunction of Criminal
Opportunity.
 ‘Deter’ obviously pre-existed in the security world
but with the loose meaning of ‘anything that puts
the perpetrator off ’. The Rational Choice agenda
and its manifestation in the 25 T principles yielded
the more precise Deter (increase perceived risk) and
Discourage (increase perceived effort, reduce
perceived reward: see also Felson 1995). Reflecting
discussions with clients/users we decided to split
deter into Deter-known and Deter-unknown, given
the latter was claimed to convey distinctly different,
and stronger, influences on perpetrators.
 Physical blocking, Defeat/Delay, originated from a
combination of target hardening (25 T) and creating
target enclosure (CCO).
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 Deflecting offenders in 25 T, combined with offender
presence in CCO, plus security ‘decoy’ attractions
(described above) led to Deflect from/Direct to.
 Enforcement actions of Detect and Detain took the
principles beyond normal SCP though perception of
these give force to deterrence, and remove offender
presence (as in Routine Activities and CCO).
 Control tools/weapons (25 T) and the more generic
restrict resources for offending (CCO) led to
Disable/Deny, covering two distinct but linked
aspects, as with blocking wireless signals and
confiscating camera phones.
 Alert conscience (25 T) and the more generic
readiness to offend (CCO) yielded Demotivate
(since this applies to SCP we are here talking about
proximal, situational influences on motivation like
pictures of families at risk of harm, not distal ones
like radicalisation).
 As a precipitation process (Wortley 2008) that aids
preventers to detect and deter more than provoking
perpetrators to offend, we identified Disconcert. The
idea was suggested during a trial iteration of the
toolkit, by the security manager of a large London
multiplex concert venue. Queuing concert-goers
would shuffle along complex paths en route to par-
ticular events, and the security staff would randomly
reposition metal-detecting arches along the way.
The upshot was that perpetrators carrying knives,
when rounding a corner and being confronted with
the unexpected sight of an arch, would often show a
startle response, leading them to self-reveal to
watching security staff, or to be sufficiently ‘spooked’
to dispose of the weapon or turn back. Interestingly,
this knowledge capture episode shows how the tool-
kit trial process was not only necessary for design
improvements, but also constituted a means of
extracting fresh practice knowledge.
The generic definition and specific elaboration of the
above principles for controlling hostile reconnaissance
largely maintains the SCP focus on the offender’s view of
the situation. But although opportunity reduction makes a
major contribution, motivational/emotional factors are in-
cluded as per Wortley’s (2008) precipitators and the CCO.
In this, we adopt the ‘caused agent’ perspective identified
by Ekblom (2012a) whereby the offender’s behaviour is
seen as both situationally caused (by provocations and
other motivating factors) and causing of criminal or ter-
rorist events (via active taking of decisions and pursuit of
goals and plans).
Principles may act in chains: for example, Deceit
about risks of being caught can feed Deterrence. As
noted elsewhere (Tilley 1993b, Ekblom 2011) there was
often a many-to-many relationship between principle
and method. For example, Discourage could be deliv-
ered by the increased effort of circumventing Access
Control, or Misinformation in the form of the disguising
of rewarding targets. And Access Control, in turn, could
activate the principles of Discouragement, Deterrence-
known and -unknown, Detect and Detain. Recall, also,
the ‘interchangeable currency’ issue in the rational choice
agenda discussed above, meaning that activating one
principle may perturb the wider system which could re-
quire users holistically to consider pinning down other
principles simultaneously (e.g. in terms of the 25 T princi-
ples, simultaneously increasing risk and effort; in 11D
terms, Deter and Discourage).
The D principles – how the interventions are intended
to influence the offender in the proximal crime situation –
are summarised as follows.
 Defeat: physically block access and movement or
block/obscure the information that offenders want
to collect
 Disable/Deny: equipment helpful to offenders such
as bugs or cameras
 Direct/Deflect: offenders towards/away from place
or behaviour
 Deter-known: offenders know what the risk of
exposure is, and judge it unacceptable so abandon/
abort HR attempt
 Deter-unknown: offenders uncertain what control
methods they are up against, so again judge risk of
exposure unacceptable
 Discourage: offenders perceive effort too great, reward
too little, relative to risk, so abandon/abort attempt
 Demotivate: awakening, within offenders, motives/
emotions contrary to the mission, e.g. empathy with
potential victims, removing excuses, coward image
 Deceive: offenders act on wrong information on
risk, effort, reward, where to go etc., and are
exposed to immediate arrest or protracted
intelligence collection, frustrated, or mistakenly
decide not to select this site as target
 Disconcert: causing offenders to make overt
involuntary movement or otherwise become startled
 Detect: passive, and active exposure to make
offenders self-expose by instrumental, expressive or
involuntary action; by making legitimate presence/
behaviour distinctive; and by improving capacity of
people exercising security role to detect
 Detain: once offenders detected, they must be
caught and held (or credible identifying details
obtained so they can be traced)
Principles: Taming the variety
Eleven principles are considerably more for practitioners
to take in than the five of 25 T. We therefore sought to
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cluster this diversity into fewer superordinate groups.
This was a struggle: it proved impossible to derive exclu-
sive supercategories, but eventually we identified three
overarching analytic modes of action:
 Practical: limiting what perpetrators can do by
changing the environment and its contents;
 Psychological: changing how perpetrators see, think
or feel;
 Personal: spotting, identifying, catching, tracking or
tracing the perpetrators.
A given principle could reflect one, two or all three of
these modes (allowing licence for the ‘interchangeable
currency’ issue already described). Thus for example
Defeat/Delay are predominantly practical; Deceive and
Demotivate predominantly psychological; Detain and
Detect predominantly personal. Discourage is practical
and psychological, and the Deter principles are simul-
taneously practical, psychological and personal (the per-
petrator could, say, perceive and respond to the risk of
detection and arrest from the physical barriers, detec-
tors and procedures of strong access control arrange-
ments). The full connections are in Figure 1.
Beyond principles and methods
Although the focus of this article is on the principles, it
is important to see how these are intended to be applied
in the complete toolkit cycle. Users are initially required
to ‘think perpetrator’ in terms of particular, focused
‘script scenarios’ relating to specific user-defined zones
of the site (such as ‘tackling perpetrator entering site
control room, pursuing goals of obtaining strategic infor-
mation on target whilst avoiding detection). Having iden-
tified opportunities for reconnaissance at the site users
are taken through the principles and methods, and es-
sentially allowed to follow their preference in choosing
and customising particular interventions stimulated pri-
marily via the one or the other. They are, however, re-
quired at this stage to select one method at a time, and
are then supplied with a range of method-specific exem-
plars to help them generate their own control actions.
In contrast to the abstractions of high-level principles
and generic control methods of intervention, the actions
they are now prompted to suggest are concrete oper-
ational or preparatory tasks to make the current method
happen; and specific people to undertake them. (This re-
flects a subdivision of ‘Response’ in the SARA process,
advocated in the 5Is framework (Ekblom 2011). Interven-
tion covers, say, the operational action of searching
visitors’ bags for cameras. Implementation concerns the
practicalities of preparatory tasks, such as installing tables
for the search. Involvement includes for example internal
security campaigns, where the professional preventers
seek to mobilise employees to remember to search every
time, and thoroughly.) In this way a collection of actions
and relevant responsible people (security staff, other em-
ployees, trainers etc.) is built up to cover different perpet-
rator script scenarios employing a diversity of methods
and covering a range of different zones of the site.
Figure 1 Modes of action of the D principles.
Ekblom and Hirschfield Crime Science 2014, 3:2 Page 7 of 11
http://www.crimesciencejournal.com/content/3/1/2
These tasks are then reviewed from a design angle, in
which the users are prompted to shift perspective from
‘security obsession’ to additionally consider their sug-
gested actions from wider viewpoints: mainstream busi-
ness needs (e.g. profit and reputation); other security
needs (not interfering with other security tasks); societal
needs (e.g. inclusivity, health and safety); and user needs
(e.g. hassle-free visiting). Users are also encouraged to
consider wider operational requirements including cost,
staff capacity and avoiding role conflicts.
Finally, the suite of actions is considered from a manage-
ment perspective, as work to be approved and resourced
by top management, and systematically implemented,
reviewed, adjusted and improved.
Initial client and user reactions
We were conscious of our clients’ understandable inter-
est in simplification. However, the shared experience of
workshops, visits and interviews carried them with us, in
acknowledging the help users required to handle the
often inescapable complexity of their sites and the focus
and differentiation needed to address the security issues.
These developmental iterations revealed, moreover, that
right from the start practitioners at all levels grasped the
principles/methods distinction. They also appreciated the
mix of recipe and flexibility, and being made and helped
to think rather than slavishly following checklists. In fact,
many security managers wanted to rush off and apply the
toolkit, and to use it in ways that had not been anticipated,
e.g. training staff. At the time of writing, the toolkit is on
limited release for several months of formal testing, after
which final adjustments will be made.
Summary
We can draw conclusions from this work at several levels,
ranging from the contributions of design to the benefits
for practice and for crime science. But we begin with next
steps with the Ds.
Where next with the Ds?
Although we do not anticipate that the D principles will
expand in number very much, we regard them as ‘work-
in-progress’: further candidates have already been sug-
gested. Wortley (personal communication 2012) suggested
that reducing provocation could be termed ‘Dampening’;
others of his situational precipitators are worth consider-
ing. ‘Disrupting’ of perpetrators’ planned actions, leading
to an aborted mission, is another possibility closely-related
to the effects-based approach though this requires some
further thinking through. The same applies to ‘Derailing’,
whereby if things don't go according to plan, perpetrators
are forced to think on their feet and improvise ‘off-script’,
entering into unplanned and hence riskier and less effect-
ive behaviour rather than totally aborting their mission.
Again, ‘Distracting’ might jeopardise performance of
scripts and/or choice of tactical goals. And on another
tack, subdividing principles such as Demotivate might
lead to harvesting/differentiation of greater detail of
practice, for example ‘Disgust’ – where, say, skunk sprays
have halted assaults. We would encourage colleagues to
suggest new or amended principles, although we may have
to face up to running out of appropriate D words.
Although we reduced the number of control method
categories to seven in this particular instance the number
and nature of such categories is likely to differ between
crime problems and/or contexts of application. Careful
attention to the organisation of such categories, and rich
illustration of individual exemplars, is important for ef-
fective knowledge capture and transfer.
Benefits to practitioners of using the principles/methods
distinction
The principles/methods distinction adapted and taken
forward in this project confers several benefits to crime
prevention practice (see also Ekblom 2011; Tilley 2006):
 If users know how the control methods work upon
perpetrators, they can better design practical
solutions, monitor performance and consider
improvements;
 Principles are generative, i.e. they can help users
intelligently replicate (Tilley 1993a) and also
innovate (Ekblom 2002), producing plausible fresh
ideas for boundless new contexts or where no
known methods yet exist; and help them keep up
with adaptive offenders;
 Principles avoid users doing the minimum and
simply ‘designing down’ to a fixed list;
 Principles are transferrable and organise practice
knowledge.
One might think (a point suggested by a reviewer) that
surely competent practitioners make this distinction as a
matter of course? Our position is that training has to be
suitable for less competent practitioners too; and that
even for competent ones, explicit awareness and articula-
tion of the different discourses available for thinking and
communication (Ekblom 2012a) offers advantages over
the tacit.
Benefits to practitioners of the D principles
The SCP literature acknowledges the practical primacy
of principles and theory. Eck (2002), in a ‘what works’
context, states: ‘[the theories of situational prevention]
do not dictate specific actions, but provide a framework
for the creation of context- relevant interventions. In this
example, the answer to the question, “what works?” to
prevent crime at places is “routine activity theory and
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situational crime prevention.”’ [2002:105]. We support the
general spirit of this statement. However, we also note that
as the Ds illustrate, such generic ‘what works’ principles
can be further differentiated by mechanism tightly focused
on a common theme (the nature of the causal influence of
interventions on offenders). In our immediate experience,
a diverse range of security practitioners and advisors ap-
peared to understand and appreciate this approach.
In effect we are advocating a mid-range position for
knowledge transfer, somewhere between the highest-
level theory and the rather loose collection of practical
actions under the 25 T organised by limited themes. The
theory has been differentiated into the D principles and
the actions consolidated into a smaller set of method
categories (although to flesh out the toolkit, we devoted
considerable effort to listing diverse exemplars under each
category). Other such mid-range formulations might be
considered worth developing in conveying the insights of
Crime Science to practitioners; however, as the present
project showed, this was no back-of-the-envelope affair
but an extensive and intensive exercise involving re-
searchers and practitioners.
Benefits to practitioners of using the modes of action
The modes of action which organise the D principles –
Practical, Psychological and Personal – offer the broadest
and most flexible way of contemplating interventions. But
by the same token, with breadth and flexibility comes the
downside of potential vagueness. This suggests, again, the
presentation of exemplars, methods, principles and modes
as alternatives to be continually switched between rather
than a hierarchy of use. The modes bear some affinity to
the Haddon Matrix (e.g. Haddon, 1980; see also Clarke
and Newman 2006) for accidental injury prevention,
which divides contributing factors into host, agent or vec-
tor and environment; and in a second dimension divides
the process into pre-event, event and post-event phases.
We note in passing that the second dimension could
suggest that different modes, principles or methods
could be suited to different phases. It could make a fur-
ther useful connection with the finer-grained sequential
focus of crime scripts.
Drawing on design
In some respects we have followed the spirit of the cu-
mulative approach of SCP in evolving, adapting and ex-
tending thinking in the light of new theory, research and
practice. The prime example is the extension of SCP
techniques from 12 to 16 to 25. But we have done so
with a more explicit design process.
Ekblom (2012a) argues that crime prevention practi-
tioners should ‘draw on design’: i.e. think like designers
and use design processes, rather than just use the end
products of design. This maxim was reflected within the
toolkit itself (namely, getting site security managers to
‘think designer’ at appropriate points). The crime scien-
tists in the toolkit development team followed the
maxim in their own approach too. The designers were
not simply ‘on tap’ to provide good quality graphics but
were fully involved from the start of the project. (A
designer’s view of the project is in Willcocks et al. 2012).
They contributed to the common understanding as it
evolved, giving valuable insights, raising challenges and
thinking ahead to practical toolkit possibilities including
maintaining a strong user focus. Their info-graphic rep-
resentations, produced throughout the project, contrib-
uted to reflective practice and articulation of the wider
team’s emerging ideas. Their role in the iterative develop-
ment of the Ds and the logic, workflow, illustration and
text of the toolkit as a whole contributed greatly to the
project as a whole. This is collaboration of a kind which
should be contemplated in all crime prevention projects,
whether capacity-building (as here), or operational.
Wider crime science benefits
The benefits of the principles/methods distinction to
Crime Science itself are less straightforward to state. But
we believe that articulating this particular ‘Yin and Yang’
relationship explicitly rather than tacitly can perhaps
spark new research and theory simply by encouraging
researchers to deliberately and systematically flip per-
spectives in a self-aware way.
We believe that there are particular benefits from the D
principles too. Viewing our corpus of knowledge through
a fresh facet, hence offering alternative, but rigorously and
consistently linked, perspectives on the same theories and
phenomena, can only stimulate thinking. Indeed, as we
found, the very process of cutting and polishing new facets
and trialling these on experienced and knowledgeable
practitioners itself supplied and provoked new ideas.
In terms of the content of the Ds, we believe they
should be applicable, with expansion perhaps, to the
wider field of SCP. (Indeed, they were designed to apply
to wider crime problems than terrorism in first place, in
order to motivate security managers and their directors
to use the hostile reconnaissance toolkit and apply its
results. This greater scope would enable them to the
benefit from preventing a larger number of less serious
events than just extremely rare, but high-impact terror-
ist attacks.) In this, we see some payback, for generic
SCP, of work originally undertaken with a counter-
terrorism purpose: beginning with Roach et al. (2005)
and Clarke and Newman (2006), the initial benefits
flowed in the other direction. The relatively rare oppor-
tunity to carefully and selectively blend SCP/POP know-
ledge with ideas from the conventional security and
enforcement world struck us as particularly fruitful. In
fact, this reflects the aim of POP in bringing to bear any
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and all disciplined approaches to tackle particular crime
problems.
Implications for 25 T
So where does this leave the 25 Techniques? Our pos-
ition is that they remain an excellent and versatile re-
pository of structured practical knowledge for general
purpose and introductory situational crime prevention.
But there are circumstances such as in the present pro-
ject, where situations to be addressed are highly diverse
and the only common consideration is the adaptive and
highly-motivated perpetrator. Here, approaches like the
D principles focusing more sharply on more detailed
offender-related but situational intervention mechanisms,
may offer more flexible and more tailored structuring of
knowledge, thinking and communication among practi-
tioners, and between practitioners and researchers.
Ultimately, though, only deliberate evaluation will tell
whether, following adoption of such approaches, the secur-
ity actions generated by practitioners show consistent and
significant increases in quantity and in quality. Such quality
might be defined as problem- and context-appropriate,
linked to what-works evidence and tested theory, and
where necessary, innovative.
Strategic implications
In general, we believe researchers have become somewhat
fixated on existing ways of organising Crime Science
knowledge. Moreover there is a hesitancy to develop the
science in ways that outstrip the capacity of practitioners
to understand and use the knowledge (cf. Bouhana 2013).
Clarke (2012) for example, argues for ‘good enough
theory’. But if we are to follow the Medical Science or
Engineering Science models, these make a clear distinc-
tion between the advanced science, and what the vari-
ous levels of practitioner (brain surgeon to paramedic;
aircraft designer to garage mechanic) need to know of
that science and how it is communicated. Though both
must reside on the same wing, the trailing edge should
not hold back the leading edge.
Endnotes
aWe are grateful to a reviewer for this point.
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